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Abstract
Evidence of dramatic industrialisation has been used to support the optimistic,
staple theory-­‐‑inspired account of Argentina’s late nineteenth century, which is
central to the dominant (neo)liberal narrative of the country’s history. This narrat-­‐‑
ive is here challenged by a discussion of the available evidence of industrial output
in Argentina from the 1870s to the eve of the First World War. Issue is taken, in
particular, with Roberto Cortés Conde’s widely used industrial output index,
which has suggested an 8-­‐‑9 per cent annual industrial growth rate during this peri-­‐‑
od. It is argued that he has overestimated the growth rate by relying upon dubious
data taken from Argentina’s inland revenue service. Rather than reﬂecting in-­‐‑
creased production, the rapid growth of Cortés Conde’s index is actually due to in-­‐‑
creased taxation. Alternative indicators suggest a signiﬁcantly lower annual
growth rate of around 5 per cent, although even this should only be considered in-­‐‑
dicative,  given  the  lack  of  data.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  textile  production.
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(Mis)measuring  Argentina’s  Progress:
Industrial  Output,  1870s-­‐‑1913
Joseph  A.  Francis
D.C.M. Pla`’s warning of the increasing use of ‘Mickey Mouse numbers’ by his
fellow economic historians has largely gone unheeded.1 Indeed, the triumph of
the New Economic History has seen the use of dubious historical statistics
become ever more widespread. Determined to empirically test hypotheses
derived from neoclassical economics, economic historians have generally
worked on the assumption that any number is be`er than no number at all.
Questions  relating  to  the  quality  of  those  numbers  have  tended  to  go  unasked.
This paper uses a case study to demonstrate the kinds of problems that
exist in the quantitative data that economic historians routinely use. It focuses
on Roberto Cortés Conde’s a`empts to estimate Argentina’s industrial output in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 It begins by describing how
they have reinforced an optimistic vision of Argentina’s ‘golden age’ prior to
the First World War. How dubious his estimates are is then demonstrated
through an examination of the methodology that underlies them. Crucially,
Cortés Conde has depended upon data taken from Argentina’s internal revenue
service. In doing so, he appears to have mistaken a rapid increase in the quant-­‐‑
ity of goods being taxed for an equivalent growth in the quantity being pro-­‐‑
duced, leading to a considerable upward bias in the growth rate of his index.
Other available indicators, by contrast, suggest a signiﬁcantly lower growth
rate, although even this ﬁnding should only be considered indicative, given that
the data are of poor quality and only provide a fairly narrow coverage of
industry. The paper then uses the case of textiles to demonstrate why the lack of
data is so problematic for a`empts to measure Argentina’s industrial output in
this period. Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting that this is one example
of  why  economic  historians  should  avoid  using  numbers  of  dubious  quality.
From  Pessimism  to  Optimism
The rise of the New Economic History has been associated with a swing
towards optimism in the historiography of Argentina in the half century prior
1. D.C.M.  Pla`,  Mickey  Mouse  Numbers  in  World  History:  The  Short  View,  Basingstoke,  1989.
2. R. Cortés Conde, ‘Estimaciones del producto bruto interno de Argentina 1875-­‐‑1935’, Docu-­‐‑
mento de Trabajo 3, Departamento de Economía y Matemática, Universidad de San
Andres,  1994.  
to the First World War.3 A pessimistic vision of this period had previously
reigned. It had been inspired by the ‘revisionist’ diatribes against foreign dom-­‐‑
ination that had proliferated in the interwar period, as well as ‘structuralism’,
the post-­‐‑war Latin American critique of neoclassical economic theory.4 In the
1960s and ‘70s most historians believed that Argentina had missed an important
opportunity in the late nineteenth century because its rapid growth had been
unbalanced and had not laid the foundations for more long-­‐‑term develop-­‐‑
ment – a pessimistic vision that was shared by proponents of ‘modernisation
theory’ and ‘dependency theory’ alike. Nonetheless, by the end of the twentieth
century the pendulum had decisively swung towards a far more optimistic,
(neo)liberal vision, according to which Argentina had been a successful case of
‘export-­‐‑led development’, which had culminated in the country’s ‘golden age’.
Here  this  swing  from  pessimism  to  optimism  will  be  outlined.
The pessimistic historians of nineteenth-­‐‑century Argentina had pointed
towards the country’s great regional disparities, its inegalitarian distribution of
wealth and income, and its vulnerability to ﬂuctuations in international ﬂows of
goods and capital. Aldo Ferrer’s The Argentine Economy was the most complete
expression of this pessimism.5 In an analysis of the country’s development since
colonisation, Ferrer argued that technological change, particularly improved
shipping and railways, drove the country’s integration into the world economy
during the nineteenth century. The land-­‐‑abundant Pampean zone had
prospered, as, in his words, the ‘useless territories of the colonial period [...]
became the nucleus of a rapid process of development’,6 but at the same time
integration into the world economy had brought deindustrialisation to the
country’s Interior,7 while the increasing concentration of landownership meant
that even in the Pampean zone there was widespread underemployment, which
3. For overviews of this shift in the historiography, see R. Cortés Conde, ‘Export-­‐‑Led Growth
in Latin America: 1870-­‐‑1930’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 24, Quincentenary Supple-­‐‑
ment, 1992, pp. 168-­‐‑72.; and E.J. Míguez, ‘¿Veinte años no es nada? Balance y perspectivas
de la producción reciente sobre la gran expansión agraria, 1850–1914’, in J. Gelman, ed., La
historia  económica  argentina  en  la  encrucijada,  Buenos  Aires,  2006.
4. On Argentine revisionism, see T. Halperín Donghi, El revisionismo histórico argentino,
Buenos Aires, 1970; and La Argentina y la tormenta del mundo: Ideas y ideologías entre 1930 y
1945, Buenos Aires, 2003, ch. 2. On Latin American structuralism, see J.L. Love, ‘The Rise
and Fall of Structuralism’, in V. FiwGerald and R. Thorp, eds., Economic Doctrines in Latin
America: Origins, Embedding and Evolution, Basingstoke, 2005; and R. Grosfoguel, ‘From
Cepalismo to Neoliberalism: A World-­‐‑Systems Approach to Conceptual Shifts in Latin
America’,  Review  (Fernand  Braudel  Center),  19:2,  1996.
5. A. Ferrer, The Argentine Economy, Berkeley, 1967. The original was substantially revised and
expanded in La economía argentina: Desde sus orígenes hasta principios del siglo XXI, 3rd ed.,
Buenos  Aires,  2004.
6. Ferrer,  Argentine  Economy,  p.  77.
7. Ibid.,  p.  241.
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depressed living standards.8 The country’s export-­‐‑led growth was, moreover,
vulnerable to its external position, especially because it was heavily dependent
upon imports for its supply of manufactured goods, so ﬂuctuations in the terms
of trade, a bad harvest, or an interruption of capital inﬂows could have severely
negative  consequences  for  growth.9
A similarly pessimistic interpretation was oﬀered by those following the
principles of modernisation theory. The case of Roberto Cortés Conde is partic-­‐‑
ularly notable because he would subsequently become one of the most promin-­‐‑
ent optimists, producing inﬂuential accounts of Argentina’s progress in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.10 In the 1960s, by contrast, his work
had reﬂected the consensus that Argentina’s rapid growth prior to the First
World War had represented a missed opportunity.11 External circumstances, he
claimed, had been highly favourable for the country, allowing it to prosper by
bringing new land into production through a rapid expansion of the frontier.
Nevertheless, this extensive growth was limited by the closing of the frontier,
while it was also vulnerable to changes in the external environment, especially
given that the country had failed to industrialise. The result, Cortés Conde con-­‐‑
cluded, was that Argentina’s apparent prosperity was more illusion than
reality.  He  wrote:
Testimonies of the time speak clearly enough of the sudden luxury of the until re-­‐‑
cently austere society of the River Plate; the ostentatious buildings and a way of life
that came close to the [...] richest and most sophisticated capitals of Europe. [...]
This fact created the impression that [Argentina] had reached the levels of the most
progressive and industrialised countries, and to some extent it had: a European
population, extensive education, urban centres, such as Buenos Aires, that had
li`le to envy in those of old Europe. Yet something was lacking. Behind the ad-­‐‑
vanced urban Argentina was a virtually pastoral society. There was no correlate in-­‐‑
dustrial development. When circumstances changed and the external impetus disap-­‐‑
peared,  we  found  that  the  castle  had  been  built  on  air.12
8. Ibid.,  p.  116.
9. Ibid.,  pp.  102-­‐‑03,  122.
10. R. Cortés Conde, El progreso argentino: 1880-­‐‑1914, Buenos Aires, 1979; ‘The Export Economy
of Argentina 1880-­‐‑1920’, in idem and S.J. Hunt, eds., The Latin American Economies: Growth
and the Export Sector 1880-­‐‑1930, New York, 1985; ‘The Growth of the Argentine Economy, c.
1870-­‐‑1914’, in L. Bethall, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, V, c. 1870-­‐‑1930, Cam-­‐‑
bridge, 1986; La economía argentina en el largo plazo: Ensayos de historia económica de los siglos
XIX y XX, Buenos Aires, 1997; and ‘The Vicissitudes of an Exporting Economy: Argentina
(1875-­‐‑1930)’, in E. Cárdenas, J.A. Ocampo, and R. Thorp, eds., An Economic History of Twen-­‐‑
tieth-­‐‑Century  Latin  America,  I,  The  Export  Age,  Oxford,  2000.
11. R. Cortés Conde, ‘El ‘boom’ argentino: ¿Una oportunidad desperdiciada?’, in T. di Tella and
T. Halperín Donghi, eds., Los fragmentos del poder, Buenos Aires, 1969; also ‘Problemas del
crecimiento industrial de la Argentina (1870-­‐‑1914)’, Desarrollo Económico, 3:1/2, 1963; and E.
Gallo  and  R.  Cortés  Conde,  La  formación  de  la  Argentina  moderna,  Buenos  Aires,  1967.
12. Cortés  Conde,  ‘‘Boom’  argentino’,  p.  241,  my  translation  and  emphasis.
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For Cortés Conde, as for others, this pessimistic vision began to change
through exposure to ‘staple theory’.13 Inspired by the work of Harold Innis,14
Canadian historians had argued that the rapid expansion of their country’s
export sector in the nineteenth century had generated linkages with other
sectors, leading to more broad-­‐‑based growth, including industrialisation.15? In a
highly inﬂuential study, Carlos Díaz Alejandro claimed that Argentina’s nine-­‐‑
teenth-­‐‑century growth had ﬁ`ed this pa`ern16 – a claim that Ezequiel Gallo
reinforced with his observation that industry had also grown rapidly at the
beginning of the twentieth century, in the midst of the export sector’s great
expansion.17 Staple theory thus allowed these scholars to advance a far more
optimistic (re)vision of Argentina’s late nineteenth century that was diametric-­‐‑
ally opposed to the far more pessimistic consensus that had previously pre-­‐‑
vailed. Cortés Conde would reinforce that (re)vision with a series of studies that
portrayed Argentina’s prosperous Pampean region in the late nineteenth
century  as  if  its  experience  had  been  representative  of  the  country  as  a  whole.18
Arguably, however, Cortés Conde’s most important contribution would
be quantitative. In a 1994 working paper he appeared to decisively verify the
optimistic (re)vision by producing historical gross domestic product (GDP)
statistics that showed rapid industrialisation occurring alongside the export
expansion.19 Cortés Conde showed industry growing at a phenomenal trend
rate of 8.4 per cent per year during 1875-­‐‑1913, compared to an annual growth
rate of just 4.4 per cent for agriculture.20?An apparently revised version of these
numbers would then increase the annual trend industrial growth rate to 8.8 per
cent. Unfortunately, exactly what changes were made to his original estimates
were not speciﬁed, but in any case both sets of numbers conﬁrmed the optim-­‐‑
istic staple theory-­‐‑inspired (re)vision, in which rapid industrialisation accom-­‐‑
panied  export-­‐‑led  growth.?
13. For example, Cortés Conde, ‘Export Economy’, pp. 170-­‐‑71; and ‘Growth of the Argentine
Economy’,  p.  355.
14. H.  Innis,  Essays  in  Canadian  Economic  History,  Toronto,  1956.
15. The ﬁrst major statement came from M.H. Watkins, ‘A Staple Theory of Economic Growth’,
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29:2, 1963; cf. ‘Staples Redux’, Studies in
Political Economy, 79, 2007. Also see A.O. Hirschman, ‘A Generalized Linkage Approach to
Development, with Special Reference to Staples’, Economic Development and Cultural Change,
25,  Supplement,  1977
16. C.F. Díaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic, New Haven,
1970,  pp.  9-­‐‑11.
17. E. Gallo, ‘Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Development in Argentina’, in R. Carr, ed.,
Latin American Aﬀairs, Oxford, 1970; also L. Geller, ‘El crecimiento industrial argentino
hasta  1914  y  la  teoría  del  bien  primario  exportable’,  Trimestre  Económico,  37:148(4),  1970.
18. Cortés Conde, Progreso argentino; ‘Export Economy’; and ‘Growth of the Argentine
Economy’.
19. Cortés  Conde,  ‘Estimaciones  del  producto’.
20. The  trend  growth  rate  is  calculated  as  the  coeﬃcient  of  the  exponential  trendline.
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Cortés Conde’s numbers have subsequently become a mainstay of the eco-­‐‑
nomic historiography. Their major impact can be understood by placing them
within the context of the debate about Argentina’s industrialisation as it stood
when he released them. At the time, a prominent literature review explained
that the debate between pessimists and optimists had been brought to an
impasse  due  to  the  lack  of  data:
[T]he discussion ceased before it had ﬁnished, probably because it could only go
on producing more of the same arguments with the tools available. Thus the estim-­‐‑
ates of the economic indicators on which many of these studies were based were
not revised. Nor did researchers undertake a search of the primary sources that
would  have  allowed  them  to  line  up  new  evidence.21
Given this impasse, Cortés Conde’s numbers had a major impact. They inspired
other researchers to verify his ﬁnding of rapid industrialisation using more
fragmentary data.22 Few, nonetheless, appear to have looked at the methodo-­‐‑
logy underlying Cortés Conde’s estimates, nor, crucially, have they a`empted
to replicate them – a task that will be undertaken in this paper. It will be shown
that only the lack of such checks has allowed Cortés Conde’s numbers to
feature so prominently in the more optimistic accounts of Argentina’s nine-­‐‑
teenth  century.
What  Did  Cortés  Conde  Do?
Cortés Conde’s industrial output index combines series for nine industries,
weighted according to their shares of value added in 1914.23 Table 1 reproduces
the weights assigned to the nine components and summarises the sources that
Cortés Conde used to calculate the output for each. As can be seen, his estim-­‐‑
ates are based on a combination of trade data, oﬃcial statistics of land in cultiv-­‐‑
ation, and the revenues from the internal taxes that were levied on the produc-­‐‑
tion  of  a  variety  of  goods  from  the  1890s  onwards.24
What Cortés Conde has revealed about the evolution of each of these com-­‐‑
 
21. J.C. Korol and H. Sabato, ‘Incomplete Industrialization: An Argentine Obsession’, Latin
American  Research  Review,  25:1,  1990,  pp.  23-­‐‑24.
22. F. Rocchi, Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in Argentina During the Export Boom Years,
1870-­‐‑1930, Stanford, 2006, esp. pp. 21, 24-­‐‑25, 42; and M.I. Barbero and F. Rocchi, ‘Industry’,
in G. della Paolera and A.M. Taylor, eds., A New Economic History of Argentina, Cambridge,
2003, esp. pp. 264-­‐‑65; also Y. Pineda, Industrial Development in a Frontier Economy: The Indus-­‐‑
trialization  of  Argentina,  1890-­‐‑1930,  Stanford,  2009.
23. Cortés Conde based his calculation of industry’s value added on the 1914 industrial census,
which actually recorded value added in 1913. To that ﬁgure he made various adjustments,
especially for meat production in abatoirs, together with industrial production outside
factories.  Cortés  Conde,  ‘Estimaciones  del  producto’,  pp.  8-­‐‑11.
24. See D.J. Guy, ‘Carlos Pellegrini and the Politics of Early Argentine Industrialization, 1873–
1906’,  Journal  of  Latin  American  Studies,  11:1,  1979,  pp.  132-­‐‑36.
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Table  1
Components  of  Cortés  Conde’s  Industrial  Output  Index
Start
yeara
% of
totalb
% of
indexc Sources for output estimates
Beer 1876 2.7 6.3 During 1876-92, the quantity of hops imports. From 1892, 
from the internal revenue returns.
Dairy 1894 2.2 5.3 During 1894 to 1903, a percentage of exports. From 1903, 
official production statistics from Revista de Economía 
Argentina.
Flour 1875 2.5 6.0 During 1875-1907, implicit wheat consumption, calculated as
wheat production plus imports minus exports, with wheat 
production estimated from official statistics of the amount of 
land in cultivation published in Estadística Agrícola. From 
1908, official production statistics published in Estadística 
Agrícola and Revista de Economía Argentina.
Flour 
products
1875 4.0 9.6 Implicit flour consumption, calculated as flour production 
plus imports minus exports.
Meat 1875 14.7 34.9 Exports plus domestic consumption. The latter is estimated 
as a function of population, the price of meat, and wages.
Sugar 1875 5.7 13.5 During 1875-92, the area cultivated with sugarcane. From 
1892, from the government’s internal revenue returns.
Textiles 1879 2.2 5.3 From 1879, a percentage of the value of dirty wool exports, 
the value of yarn imports, and the value of raw cotton 
production, which were summed together and deflated by an
index of imported cloth prices.
Tobacco 1900 3.8 9.1 Apparent consumption of tobacco as a raw material, 
calculated as tobacco production plus imports, minus 
exports. Production is from the internal revenue returns.
Wine 1892 4.2 10.0 During 1892-1903, the internal revenue returns. During 
1903-12, production is interpolated using census data on 
cultivated land or value of output (it is unclear which) for 
1908 and 1914. During 1912-13, official production statistics 
from Estadística Agrícola.
a  First  year  of  output  estimates.
b  Percentage  of  industry’s  total  value  added  in  1914.
c  Percentage  of  the  sample’s  total  value  added  in  1914.
Source:  Cortés  Conde,  ‘Estimaciones  del  producto’,  pp.  10-­‐‑11,  13-­‐‑14.
ponents is confusing to say the least. As reproduced in Table 2, he has publ-­‐‑
ished the average annual growth rates for food and textiles, together with the
index as a whole. The most curious aspect of these numbers is that the overall
output index has an extremely high growth rate for the 1890s, even though food
processing, which was by far the largest sector, grew much more slowly. Thus,
food accounted for 69 per cent of the value of the index in its 1914 base year (see
Table 1), so in purely mathematical terms it seems unclear how Cortés Conde
could have arrived at a 12 per cent growth rate for the 1890s, given that the
dominant  component  of  his  index  grew  so  slowly.
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Table  2
Cortés  Conde’s  Industrial  Growth  Rates,  1875-­‐‑1910
Annual growth rate, %
Total Food Textiles
1875-1890 5.2 5.6 3.9
1890-1900 11.5 4.2 12.7
1900-1910 7.8 6.7 7.4
Source:  Cortés  Conde,  Economía  argentina,  pp.  207,  209,  Cuadros  15  and  17.
The high overall industrial growth rate of the 1890s initially appears inex-­‐‑
plicable. It could not have been due to the rapid expansion of the textile com-­‐‑
ponent, given that the la`er made up only 5 per cent of the total index in its
1914 base year (see Table 1). Rapid growth must therefore have been driven by
the non-­‐‑food and non-­‐‑textile components. Given that tobacco products are only
included in the index from 1900 onwards, this only leaves beverages, so it can
be assumed that the rapid growth of industrial output in the 1890s was driven
by beer and wine, the two beverages that made up 6 and 10 per cent respect-­‐‑
ively of Cortés Conde’s index in 1914. These weights, together with those given
to food and textiles, suggest that beverages output must somehow have expan-­‐‑
ded at around 40 per cent per year during 1890-­‐‑1900 to produce the overall
annual  growth  rate  of  11.5  per  cent.
A roughly 40 per cent annual growth rate for beverages seems implaus-­‐‑
ible, until Cortés Conde’s original sources are consulted. For both beer and
wine, he relied upon data from the internal revenue returns. Those data for beer
and wine are reproduced in Tables 3 and 4. They show that the beer being taxed
increased at an annual trend rate of 11 per cent during 1891-­‐‑1900, while wine
being taxed grew by an incredible 60 per cent per year during 1892-­‐‑1900. Wine
could, for this reason, account for Cortés Conde’s 12 per cent annual industrial
growth  rate.
If this is correct, the problem is fairly obvious: in reality, there was no such
dramatic increase in wine output; rather, the 64-­‐‑per cent growth rate in the
1890s merely reﬂected the extension of the taxes bring levied. So-­‐‑called ‘natural
wines’, which made up the vast bulk of production, were only taxed for the ﬁrst
time in 1898, when a levy of four cents per litre was imposed.25 The quantity of
wine taxed thus increased dramatically, but it was not a result of an equivalent
growth in production. By contrast, the land cultivated with vines, a more accur-­‐‑
ate indicator of wine output, grew at an annual rate of roughly 5 per cent
 
25. P. Barrio de Villanueva, ‘Controles estatales a la industria del vino en Mendoza, 1890-­‐‑1914’,
H-­‐‑industri@: Revista de historia de la industria, los servicios y las empresas en América Latina, 4:7,
2010, pp. 8-­‐‑9, available online at h`p://www.hindustria.com.ar/images/client_gallery/
HindustriaNro7Barrio.pdf  (accessed  14  May  2013).
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during the 1890s.26 Cortés Conde has thus grossly overestimated the expansion
of wine output by mistaking an increase in the quantity of wine being taxed with
the quantity being produced. Moreover, given that the state’s capacity to collect
these taxes probably increased after they were ﬁrst introduced, it seems likely
that there would be an upward bias in the trend of other output series calcu-­‐‑
lated using internal revenue data. They are, in other words, likely to produce
growth  rates  that  are  too  high.
Alternative  Data
Other data, moreover, support the impression that Cortés Conde has overestim-­‐‑
ated Argentina’s industrial growth. Proxies for output in various industries are
summarised in Table 5. With the exception of sugar, they are not direct meas-­‐‑
ures of output but mainly relate to the apparent supply of raw materials and
other inputs, which have been compiled from trade and agricultural statistics.
Exports are also used for some industries, and crude estimates have been made
for  domestic  consumption  in  a  few  cases.
Unfortunately, few of the indicators can be considered highly reliable
measures of output. For example, 1919 consumption levels were used through-­‐‑
out, which is unrealistic because they would have changed over time. It is likely
that dairy-­‐‑product consumption increased, so using 1919 levels would give a
downward bias to the trend of the output series. On the other hand, meat con-­‐‑
sumption probably fell, as the growth of chilled and frozen beef exports pushed
up prices on the domestic market. The result is likely to be an upward bias in
the trend of the meat output series. Similarly, the ﬂour and tobacco yields are
based on early twentieth-­‐‑century data that might not be representative of earlier
years. Already, then, it is possible to see some of the considerable margins for
error  that  using  such  indicators  entails.
For what they are worth, the indicators listed in Table 5 suggest a consid-­‐‑
erably lower growth rate. Some industries did expand at the kind of rates sug-­‐‑
gested by Cortés Conde: sugar reﬁning, paper making, and metallurgy prob-­‐‑
ably increased by at least 9 per cent annually; ﬂour milling and winemaking by
around 8 per cent. Yet, indicators for other industries show far slower growth:
meat products grew at roughly 4 per cent per year; tobacco products and cloth-­‐‑
ing by perhaps 3 per cent. With each series turned into a quantity relative with
1913 as their reference year, then weighted by their 1913 value added in the
industrial census, they provide an index that suggests a 5 per cent aggregate
annual growth rate, which, as shown in Figure 1, is considerably slower than
the  rates  suggested  by  Cortés  Conde.27
26. Dirección General de Economía y Estadística (DGEE), Estadística Agrícola: Año Agrícola
1913-­‐‑14,  Buenos  Aires,  1914,  p.  18.
27. For the construction of this index and the underlying series, see the accompanying work-­‐‑
book  at  h`p://www.joefrancis.info/data/Francis_Arg_ind.xlsx.
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Table  5
Indicators  of  Industrial  Growth  for  Argentina,  1870s-­‐‑1913
Start
year
Annual
trend
growth
rate, %
% of
1913
value
addeda
Indicators
Beef products 1875 4.9 4.9 Exports of dried, frozen, and chilled beef, valued by 
1913 export prices.
Beer 1876 7.0 3.6 Hops imported.
Clothing 1883 2.9 3.7 Common sewing thread, reels imported.
Dairy 1875 4.3 3.0 Apparent production: net dairy exports plus assumed
consumption based on 1919 consumption levels, 
with both valued by 1913 export prices.
Flour 1876 8.0 3.4 Apparent wheat consumption: wheat production 
based on cultivated land, minus net exports.
Flour products 1876 7.3 6.4 Apparent flour consumption: assuming 600 kg of 
flour per ton of apparent wheat consumption, minus 
net wheat exports.
Iron and steel 1876 7.8 5.0 Imports of iron bars, steel bars, and worked iron, by 
weight.
Pork products 1875 0.6 0.5 Pork exports.
Paper 1892 10.7 0.5 Imports of paper paste.
Sacks 1880 9.1 0.8 Imports of sacking material.
Sugar 1872 10.2 7.7 Official production figures.
Tobacco 1876 3.1 5.2 Apparent consumption of raw tobacco: assuming a 
yield of 550 kg per ha of land cultivated, minus net 
exports.
Wine 1873 5.9 5.7 Grapes: land cultivated.
a Value added was calculated from the industrial census by subtracting the cost of
raw  materials  from  the  gross  value  of  output.
Sources:
1919  consumption  levels:  Tornquist,  Economic  Development,  p.  270-­‐‑71.
550 kg tobacco yield: Comité Nacional de Geografía (CNG), Anuario geográﬁco ar-­‐‑
gentino,  Buenos  Aires,  1941,  p.  245.
600  kg  ﬂour  yield:  Ibid.,  p.  340.
1913 value added weights: Calculated from Comisión Nacional del Censo (CNC),
Tercer  censo  nacional,  VII,  Censo  de  las  industrias,  Buenos  Aires,  1917,  pp.  27-­‐‑34.
Cultivated land: DGEE, Estadística Agrícola: 1913-­‐‑14, p. 18; and CNG, Anuario ge-­‐‑
ográﬁco,  pp.  207,  227,  245.
Imports and exports: F. Lawina, Estadísti ca retrospectiva del comercio exterior argentino
1875-­‐‑1904,  Buenos  Aires,  1905;  and  DGEN,  Anuario,  various  years.
Population: V. Vázquez-­‐‑Presedo, El caso argentino: Migración de factores, comercio ex-­‐‑
terior  y  desarrollo,  1875-­‐‑1914,  Buenos  Aires,  1971,  p.  92.
Sugar  production:  CNG,  Anuario  geográﬁco,  p.  230.
MEASURING  ARGENTINA’S  PROGRESS
- 11 -
Figure  1
Three  Estimates  of  Argentina’s  Industrial  Output,  1876-­‐‑1913
1 
10 
100 
1000 
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 
Alternative 
Cortés Conde 
Original Revised 
1913 = 100, log scale 
Sources:
Alternative:  see  text  and  Table  5.
Cortés Conde: Original: Cortés Conde, ‘Estimaciones del producto’; Revised:
Cortés  Conde,  Economía  argentina,  pp.  230-­‐‑31,  Cuadro  A1.
This ﬁnding can only be treated as indicative, nonetheless, because the
sample still suﬀers from the fundamental issue of coverage. The industries rep-­‐‑
resented in the alternative index accounted for just half of industrial output in
the 1913 base year. Cortés Conde, by contrast, claims that his index covers 42
per cent of industrial value added in 1914, although even this this ﬁgure is only
arrived at by inﬂating the value of meat processing to account for aba`oirs,
which the census did not include.28 Hence, Cortés Conde claims that total meat
value added was m$n148 million, while the census reported that meatpacking
and pork produced m$n42 million. He thus seems to suggest that over two
thirds of meat processing’s value added came from producing for domestic con-­‐‑
sumption, which is highly improbable.29 In all likelihood, therefore, the cov-­‐‑
erage of Cortés Conde’s index is below 42 per cent. The alternative index shown
in Figure 1 is preferable, then, but it still provides far from the 70-­‐‑80 per cent
coverage that a reliable index would need. In this, it reﬂects the basic lack of
data  on  industrial  output  in  Argentina  in  this  period.
28. Cortés  Conde,  ‘Estimaciones  del  producto’,  p.  8.
29. The government’s estimates suggested that 47 per cent of the physical volume of beef pro-­‐‑
duced in Argentina was exported in 1914. Junta Nacional de Carnes, Estadísticas básicas,
Buenos Aires, 1966, p. 7. Exports’ share of value added would presumably have been even
greater,  given  the  greater  amount  of  work  involved  in  preparing  and  packaging  the  meat.
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The  Missing  Textile  Producers
The case of textiles illustrates why the lack of data is so problematic for any
a`empt to construct a reliable industrial output index. It is important because
textile production was one of Argentina’s largest industrial sectors for much of
the nineteenth century. Indeed, textiles production had been an important
activity for many peasant communities in the Interior since the colonial era and
continued to be so into the 1870s.30 There are, nonetheless, virtually no data on
textile  output  and  li`le  even  on  inputs.  
Such is the lack of data that estimates of textiles output must rely on
assumptions that are so heroic that they appear quixotic on closer examination.
Hence, Cortés Conde calculates textile production by summing a percentage of
the value of dirty wool exports, the value of raw co`on production, and the
value of yarn imports, then deﬂating the total by an index of imported wool and
co`on cloth prices.31 In practice, this means assigning roughly equal weights to
dirty wool exports and yarn imports, given that raw co`on production was
minimal. The problem is that there is not even a remotely credible estimate of
the domestic processing of wool prior to 1908,32 so Cortés Conde cannot have
used any reliable series for this part of his calculations. Most likely, he simply
took a ﬁxed percentage of dirty wool exports, which says nothing about the
growth and ﬂuctuations in the amount of wool processed domestically. As a
result,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  he  has  measured  textile  output.
Cortés Conde’s estimates of textile output are worrying because the
optimistic picture they paint – 13 per cent annual growth in the 1890s!33 – ﬂies in
the face of one of the few reliable data sources for nineteenth-­‐‑century Argen-­‐‑
tina. The national censuses show a dramatic decline in the number of textile
producers, as shown in Table 6. In 1869 the ﬁrst national census found 94,882
textile producers, with 95 per cent of them located in the Interior regions, where
they made up fully 19 per cent of the labour force. Their numbers then fell dra-­‐‑
matically following the arrival of the railways in the 1880s, as cheaper factory-­‐‑
made fabrics, both imported and produced in the Li`oral using imported yarns,
ﬂooded the Interior’s markets. As can be seen in Table 6, the number of textile
producers fell to just 30,980 in 1914.34 One of the few reliable data sources thus
 
30. P. Santos Martínez, Las industrias durante el Virreinato (1776-­‐‑1810), Buenos Aires, 1969, pp.
38-­‐‑50; and D.J. Guy, ‘Women, Peonage, and Industrialization: Argentina, 1810-­‐‑1914’, Latin
American  Research  Review,  16:3,  1981.
31. Cortés  Conde,  ‘Estimaciones  del  producto’,  p.  14.
32. CNG,  Anuario  geográﬁco,  pp.  273-­‐‑75.
33. See  Table  2.
34. This fall is slightly exaggerated because the 1869 census includes child workers, whereas
the 1895 and 1914 only recorded the occupations of those aged 14 and over. However, only
6 per cent of textile workers in the smaller sample were below 14 years old, so applying
that percentage to the ﬁgure of 94,882 textile workers would still suggest a fall from 89,189
in  1869.
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          Table  6
Argentina’s  Textile  Producers,  1869-­‐‑1914
Total FederalCapital
Other
Littoral Centre West North South
(a) Number of producers
1869 94,882 78 4,759 49,256 17,562 23,227 n.a.
1895 39,725 538 1,101 18,574 11,140 8,246 126
1914 30,980 2,528 1,018 14,860 5,836 6,610 128
(b) % of total occupations
1869 11.1 0.1 1.6 22.6 14.1 18.4 n.a.
1895 2.4 0.2 0.2 7.3 6.7 4.3 2.0
1914 1.0 0.2 0.1 3.1 2.6 2.2 0.4
Note: In 1869, the ﬁgures are for all those who declared occupations. In 1895 and
1914 they are for those aged 14 and above. Textile workers include the following
census  occupations:
1869: blanqueadores; cordeleros, hiladores é hiladoras; tejedores y tejedoras;
pelloneros;  tintoreros;  torcedores  de  lana,  seda,  etc.
1895:  cordeleros,  cabulleros,  etc;  tejedores;  tintoreros.
1914: cardadores de lana; cordeleros; fabricantes de tejidos; hiladores, tejedores, tel-­‐‑
laristas;  tintoreros.
The  composition  of  the  regions  is  based  on  the  classiﬁcations  in  the  censuses.
Sources: Calculated from Superintendente del Censo, Primer censo de la República
Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1872, pp. 642-­‐‑669; Comisión Directiva, Segundo censo de la
República Argentina, II, Población, Buenos Aires, 1898, pp. 47-­‐‑50, 139-­‐‑142, 183-­‐‑186,
216-­‐‑219,  257-­‐‑60,  297-­‐‑300,  326-­‐‑29,  365-­‐‑68,  
shows a dramatic decline in Argentina’s textile sector, which directly contra-­‐‑
dicts Cortés Conde’s ﬁndings. In fact, the rapid growth found by Cortés Conde
is likely to be a symptom of that decline, given that increasing yarn imports
reﬂected the displacement of the Interior’s peasant producers by factories pro-­‐‑
cessing  imported  yarns  in  the  Li`oral.
Ideally, it would be possible to present an alternative, more reliable estim-­‐‑
ate of Argentina’s textile production that could be incorporated into an aggreg-­‐‑
ate industrial output index. Such a task would be particularly important
because textiles were Argentina’s most important (proto)industry at the beginn-­‐‑
ing of the period and subsequently appear to have declined. Yet, it is diﬃcult to
imagine any methodology that could be used to construct a suﬃciently reliable
estimate.  Unfortunately,  the  required  data  simply  do  not  exist.
Any  Number  or  No  Number?
This paper has discussed why it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to measure
Argentina’s industrial output in the late nineteenth century. Particular a`ention
has been given to Cortés Conde’s industrial output index because only he has
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been suﬃciently bold to construct one going back to the 1870s. It has been
argued that the high annual growth rate found by Cortés Conde is mainly the
result of his mistaking an increase in the amount of goods being taxed with the
amount actually being produced, particularly for the case of wine. A range of
alternative data suggest a lower annual growth rate of around 5 per cent. Even
this, nonetheless, can only be considered indicative, given the issues of data
quality and, even more importantly, coverage. The series that do exist only
cover around half of industrial value added, with important industries, such as
textiles,  impossible  to  adequately  measure.  
Why this ma`ers for Argentina’s historiography can be seen in the impact
of Cortés Conde’s estimates on the subsequent literature. His high growth rates
give the impression that there must have been virtually no industrial activity in
Argentina prior to the 1870s. Hence, in his detailed study of Argentina’s indus-­‐‑
trialisation, Fernando Rocchi has evocatively claimed that ‘Argentine industry
[...] started almost from scratch, and its factories rose like chimneys in a
desert’.35 In this way, Rocchi returns to the imagery of Argentina’s nineteenth-­‐‑
century statebuilders, who saw the Pampean and Patagonian lands to the south
and west of Buenos Aires as a desert to be se`led by European colonists, irre-­‐‑
spective of the wishes of their gaucho and indian inhabitants.36 Rocchi’s version
of this narrative portrays the Interior as a market to be conquered by modern
manufactured goods, with li`le mention of the widespread (proto)industry that
persisted through the 1870s but then declined. Rocchi states, for instance, that
Córdoba ‘did not have a large handicraft tradition’,37 yet the 1869 census
showed that textiles producers alone made up 13 per cent of the province’s
workforce. They then fell to just 1 per cent in 1914.38 Worse still, even when
Rocchi does acknowledge that there was deindustrialisation in the Interior, he
implies that it was a result of competition with the Li`oral’s burgeoning indus-­‐‑
trial sector, with imports playing only a minor role.39 Textiles again illustrate
why this is misleading: the 1914 census report estimated that less than a quarter
of the country’s demand for textiles was being met by domestic production,40 so
the Interior’s textile production had been predominantly replaced by imports.
This suggests a more pessimistic view of Argentina’s late nineteenth-­‐‑century
industrialisation  than  has  prevailed  since  Cortés  Conde’s  numbers  appeared.
Looking beyond Argentina’s historiography, this paper also has implica-­‐‑
tions for the wider study of economic history. Since the ‘cliometric revolution’
35. Rocchi,  Chimneys  in  the  Desert,  p.  26.
36. See,  for  example,  N.  Shumway,  The  Invention  of  Argentina,  Berkeley,  1991.
37. Rocchi,  Chimneys  in  the  Desert,  p.  138.
38. Sources  as  in  Table  6.
39. F. Rocchi, ‘El péndulo de la riqueza: La economía argentina en el período 1880-­‐‑1916’, in M.
Zaido Lobato, ed., Nueva historia argentina, V, El progreso, la modernización y sus límites
(1880-­‐‑1916),  Buenos  Aires,  2000,  p.  49.
40. CNC,  Tercer  censo  nacional,  VII,  p.  69.
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of the 1970s, the demand for historical statistics has increased dramatically, so it
has become imperative to produce more numbers, with few raising concerns
about the margins of error that they contain.41 As Angus Maddison reportedly
put it, the general a`itude has been that ‘Any number is be`er than no
number’.42 Some have defended this a`itude by arguing that the margins of
error are so small that they will not eﬀect the analysis,43 yet the case of Argen-­‐‑
tina’s industrial output in the late nineteenth century clearly demonstrates how
bad numbers can lead to conclusions that would otherwise be diﬃcult to
sustain. It seems safe to assume that similar ‘Mickey Mouse numbers’ must
have proliferated in the historiographies of other countries due to a lack of scru-­‐‑
tiny  of  their  sources  and  methodologies.
A possible rebu`al is that it is only through the use of bad numbers that
good numbers will ever be produced,44 but it seems likely that sometimes it will
never be possible to produce good numbers. It is hard to conceive how it would
be possible to construct a reliable estimate of Argentina’s industrial output from
the 1870s to 1913, given that the raw data simply do not exist. It may be, then,
that economic historians have to accept the limitations of their discipline, as
their ambition to quantify history meets the reality of a lack of data. Otherwise,
they run the risk of ﬂying too close to the sun, as their craft will be seen to
involve too much invention for their conclusions to be considered viable. For
their own sake, therefore, they may have to admit that no number can some-­‐‑
times  be  be`er  than  any  number.
41. The  canary  in  the  mine  was  Pla`,  Mickey  Mouse  Numbers.
42. Reported by P. O’Brien, ‘Myths of Eurocentrism and Material Progress’, Institute of Histor-­‐‑
ical Research Global History Seminar, 17 February 2010, online at: h`p:/
/www.history.ac.uk/podcasts/global-­‐‑history-­‐‑external/myths-­‐‑eurocentrism-­‐‑and-­‐‑material-­‐‑
progress  (accessed  15  August  2015).
43. N.F.R. Crafts, ‘Mickey Mouse Numbers in World History: The Short View. By D.C.M. Pla`’,
Journal  of  Economic  Literature,  30:1,  1992.
44. R. Middleton, ‘Mickey Mouse Numbers in World History: The Short View by D.C.M. Pla`’,
English  Historical  Review,  106:421,  1991.
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